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protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
// Copyright 2020 Sigma Prime Pty Ltd.
//
// Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
// copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
// to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
// the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
// and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
// Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
//
// The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
// all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
// OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
// FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
// AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
// LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
// FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
// DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
//!
//! Manages and stores the Scoring logic of a particular peer on the gossipsub behaviour.
use crate::time_cache::TimeCache;
use crate::{MessageId, TopicHash};
use libp2p_core::PeerId;
use log::{debug, trace, warn};
use std::collections::{hash_map, HashMap, HashSet};
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
mod params;
use crate::error::ValidationError;
pub use params::{
score_parameter_decay, score_parameter_decay_with_base, PeerScoreParams, PeerScoreThresholds,
TopicScoreParams,
};
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
/// The number of seconds delivery messages are stored in the cache.
const TIME_CACHE_DURATION: u64 = 120;
pub(crate) struct PeerScore {
params: PeerScoreParams,
/// The score parameters.
peer_stats: HashMap<PeerId, PeerStats>,
/// Tracking peers per IP.
peer_ips: HashMap<IpAddr, HashSet<PeerId>>,
/// Message delivery tracking. This is a time-cache of [`DeliveryRecord`]s.
deliveries: TimeCache<MessageId, DeliveryRecord>,
/// callback for monitoring message delivery times
message_delivery_time_callback: Option<fn(&PeerId, &TopicHash, f64)>,
}
/// General statistics for a given gossipsub peer.
struct PeerStats {
/// Connection status of the peer.
status: ConnectionStatus,
/// Stats per topic.
topics: HashMap<TopicHash, TopicStats>,
/// IP tracking for individual peers.
known_ips: HashSet<IpAddr>,
/// Behaviour penalty that is applied to the peer, assigned by the behaviour.
behaviour_penalty: f64,
/// Application specific score. Can be manipulated by calling PeerScore::set_application_score
application_score: f64,
}
enum ConnectionStatus {
/// The peer is connected.
Connected,
/// The peer is disconnected
Disconnected {
/// Expiration time of the score state for disconnected peers.
expire: Instant,
},
}
impl Default for PeerStats {
fn default() -> Self {
PeerStats {
status: ConnectionStatus::Connected,
topics: HashMap::new(),
known_ips: HashSet::new(),
behaviour_penalty: 0f64,
application_score: 0f64,
}
}
}
impl PeerStats {
/// Returns a mutable reference to topic stats if they exist, otherwise if the supplied parameters score the
/// topic, inserts the default stats and returns a reference to those. If neither apply, returns None.
pub fn stats_or_default_mut(
&mut self,
topic_hash: TopicHash,
params: &PeerScoreParams,
) -> Option<&mut TopicStats> {
if params.topics.get(&topic_hash).is_some() {
Some(self.topics.entry(topic_hash).or_default())
} else {
self.topics.get_mut(&topic_hash)
}
}
}
/// Stats assigned to peer for each topic.
struct TopicStats {
mesh_status: MeshStatus,
/// Number of first message deliveries.
first_message_deliveries: f64,
/// True if the peer has been in the mesh for enough time to activate mesh message deliveries.
mesh_message_deliveries_active: bool,
/// Number of message deliveries from the mesh.
mesh_message_deliveries: f64,
/// Mesh rate failure penalty.
mesh_failure_penalty: f64,
/// Invalid message counter.
invalid_message_deliveries: f64,
}
impl TopicStats {
/// Returns true if the peer is in the `mesh`.
pub fn in_mesh(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.mesh_status, MeshStatus::Active { .. })
}
}
/// Status defining a peer's inclusion in the mesh and associated parameters.
enum MeshStatus {
Active {
/// The time the peer was last GRAFTed;
graft_time: Instant,
/// The time the peer has been in the mesh.
mesh_time: Duration,
},
InActive,
}
impl MeshStatus {
/// Initialises a new [`MeshStatus::Active`] mesh status.
pub fn new_active() -> Self {
MeshStatus::Active {
graft_time: Instant::now(),
mesh_time: Duration::from_secs(0),
}
}
}
impl Default for TopicStats {
fn default() -> Self {
TopicStats {
mesh_status: MeshStatus::InActive,
first_message_deliveries: Default::default(),
mesh_message_deliveries_active: Default::default(),
mesh_message_deliveries: Default::default(),
mesh_failure_penalty: Default::default(),
invalid_message_deliveries: Default::default(),
}
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
struct DeliveryRecord {
status: DeliveryStatus,
first_seen: Instant,
peers: HashSet<PeerId>,
}
#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
enum DeliveryStatus {
/// Don't know (yet) if the message is valid.
Unknown,
/// The message is valid together with the validated time.
Valid(Instant),
/// The message is invalid.
Invalid,
/// Instructed by the validator to ignore the message.
Ignored,
}
impl Default for DeliveryRecord {
fn default() -> Self {
DeliveryRecord {
status: DeliveryStatus::Unknown,
first_seen: Instant::now(),
peers: HashSet::new(),
}
}
}
impl PeerScore {
/// Creates a new [`PeerScore`] using a given set of peer scoring parameters.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn new(params: PeerScoreParams) -> Self {
Self::new_with_message_delivery_time_callback(params, None)
}
pub fn new_with_message_delivery_time_callback(
params: PeerScoreParams,
callback: Option<fn(&PeerId, &TopicHash, f64)>,
) -> Self {
PeerScore {
params,
peer_stats: HashMap::new(),
peer_ips: HashMap::new(),
deliveries: TimeCache::new(Duration::from_secs(TIME_CACHE_DURATION)),
message_delivery_time_callback: callback,
}
}
/// Returns the score for a peer.
pub fn score(&self, peer_id: &PeerId) -> f64 {
let peer_stats = match self.peer_stats.get(peer_id) {
Some(v) => v,
None => return 0.0,
};
let mut score = 0.0;
// topic scores
for (topic, topic_stats) in peer_stats.topics.iter() {
// topic parameters
if let Some(topic_params) = self.params.topics.get(topic) {
// we are tracking the topic
// the topic score
let mut topic_score = 0.0;
// P1: time in mesh
if let MeshStatus::Active { mesh_time, .. } = topic_stats.mesh_status {
let p1 = {
let v = mesh_time.as_secs_f64()
/ topic_params.time_in_mesh_quantum.as_secs_f64();
if v < topic_params.time_in_mesh_cap {
v
} else {
topic_params.time_in_mesh_cap
}
};
topic_score += p1 * topic_params.time_in_mesh_weight;
}
// P2: first message deliveries
let p2 = {
let v = topic_stats.first_message_deliveries as f64;
if v < topic_params.first_message_deliveries_cap {
v
} else {
topic_params.first_message_deliveries_cap
}
};
topic_score += p2 * topic_params.first_message_deliveries_weight;
// P3: mesh message deliveries
if topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active
&& topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries
< topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_threshold
{
let deficit = topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_threshold
- topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries;
let p3 = deficit * deficit;
topic_score += p3 * topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_weight;
debug!(
"The peer {} has a mesh message delivieries deficit of {} in topic\
{} and will get penalized by {}",
peer_id,
deficit,
topic,
p3 * topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_weight
);
}
// P3b:
// NOTE: the weight of P3b is negative (validated in TopicScoreParams.validate), so this detracts.
let p3b = topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty;
topic_score += p3b * topic_params.mesh_failure_penalty_weight;
// P4: invalid messages
// NOTE: the weight of P4 is negative (validated in TopicScoreParams.validate), so this detracts.
let p4 =
topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries * topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries;
topic_score += p4 * topic_params.invalid_message_deliveries_weight;
// update score, mixing with topic weight
score += topic_score * topic_params.topic_weight;
}
}
// apply the topic score cap, if any
if self.params.topic_score_cap > 0f64 && score > self.params.topic_score_cap {
score = self.params.topic_score_cap;
}
// P5: application-specific score
let p5 = peer_stats.application_score;
score += p5 * self.params.app_specific_weight;
// P6: IP collocation factor
for ip in peer_stats.known_ips.iter() {
if self.params.ip_colocation_factor_whitelist.get(ip).is_some() {
continue;
}
// P6 has a cliff (ip_colocation_factor_threshold); it's only applied iff
// at least that many peers are connected to us from that source IP
// addr. It is quadratic, and the weight is negative (validated by
// peer_score_params.validate()).
if let Some(peers_in_ip) = self.peer_ips.get(ip).map(|peers| peers.len()) {
if (peers_in_ip as f64) > self.params.ip_colocation_factor_threshold {
let surplus = (peers_in_ip as f64) - self.params.ip_colocation_factor_threshold;
let p6 = surplus * surplus;
debug!(
"The peer {} gets penalized because of too many peers with the ip {}. \
The surplus is {}. ",
peer_id, ip, surplus
);
score += p6 * self.params.ip_colocation_factor_weight;
}
}
}
// P7: behavioural pattern penalty
if peer_stats.behaviour_penalty > self.params.behaviour_penalty_threshold {
let excess = peer_stats.behaviour_penalty - self.params.behaviour_penalty_threshold;
let p7 = excess * excess;
score += p7 * self.params.behaviour_penalty_weight;
}
score
}
pub fn add_penalty(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, count: usize) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
debug!(
"Behavioral penalty for peer {}, count = {}.",
peer_id, count
);
peer_stats.behaviour_penalty += count as f64;
}
}
fn remove_ips_for_peer(
peer_stats: &PeerStats,
peer_ips: &mut HashMap<IpAddr, HashSet<PeerId>>,
peer_id: &PeerId,
) {
for ip in peer_stats.known_ips.iter() {
if let Some(peer_set) = peer_ips.get_mut(ip) {
peer_set.remove(peer_id);
}
}
}
pub fn refresh_scores(&mut self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let params_ref = &self.params;
let peer_ips_ref = &mut self.peer_ips;
self.peer_stats.retain(|peer_id, peer_stats| {
if let ConnectionStatus::Disconnected { expire } = peer_stats.status {
// has the retention period expired?
if now > expire {
// yes, throw it away (but clean up the IP tracking first)
Self::remove_ips_for_peer(peer_stats, peer_ips_ref, peer_id);
// re address this, use retain or entry
return false;
}
// we don't decay retained scores, as the peer is not active.
// this way the peer cannot reset a negative score by simply disconnecting and reconnecting,
// unless the retention period has elapsed.
// similarly, a well behaved peer does not lose its score by getting disconnected.
return true;
}
for (topic, topic_stats) in peer_stats.topics.iter_mut() {
// the topic parameters
if let Some(topic_params) = params_ref.topics.get(topic) {
// decay counters
topic_stats.first_message_deliveries *=
topic_params.first_message_deliveries_decay;
if topic_stats.first_message_deliveries < params_ref.decay_to_zero {
topic_stats.first_message_deliveries = 0.0;
}
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries *=
topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_decay;
if topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries < params_ref.decay_to_zero {
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries = 0.0;
}
topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty *= topic_params.mesh_failure_penalty_decay;
if topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty < params_ref.decay_to_zero {
topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty = 0.0;
}
topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries *=
topic_params.invalid_message_deliveries_decay;
if topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries < params_ref.decay_to_zero {
topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries = 0.0;
}
// update mesh time and activate mesh message delivery parameter if need be
if let MeshStatus::Active {
ref mut mesh_time,
ref mut graft_time,
} = topic_stats.mesh_status
{
*mesh_time = now.duration_since(*graft_time);
if *mesh_time > topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_activation {
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active = true;
}
}
}
}
// decay P7 counter
peer_stats.behaviour_penalty *= params_ref.behaviour_penalty_decay;
if peer_stats.behaviour_penalty < params_ref.decay_to_zero {
peer_stats.behaviour_penalty = 0.0;
}
true
});
}
/// Adds a connected peer to [`PeerScore`], initialising with empty ips (ips get added later
/// through add_ip.
pub fn add_peer(&mut self, peer_id: PeerId) {
let peer_stats = self.peer_stats.entry(peer_id).or_default();
// mark the peer as connected
peer_stats.status = ConnectionStatus::Connected;
}
/// Adds a new ip to a peer, if the peer is not yet known creates a new peer_stats entry for it
pub fn add_ip(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, ip: IpAddr) {
trace!("Add ip for peer {}, ip: {}", peer_id, ip);
let peer_stats = self.peer_stats.entry(*peer_id).or_default();
protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
// Mark the peer as connected (currently the default is connected, but we don't want to
// rely on the default).
peer_stats.status = ConnectionStatus::Connected;
// Insert the ip
peer_stats.known_ips.insert(ip);
self.peer_ips
.entry(ip)
.or_insert_with(HashSet::new)
.insert(*peer_id);
protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
}
/// Removes an ip from a peer
pub fn remove_ip(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, ip: &IpAddr) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
peer_stats.known_ips.remove(ip);
if let Some(peer_ids) = self.peer_ips.get_mut(ip) {
trace!("Remove ip for peer {}, ip: {}", peer_id, ip);
peer_ids.remove(peer_id);
} else {
trace!(
"No entry in peer_ips for ip {} which should get removed for peer {}",
ip,
peer_id
);
}
} else {
trace!(
"No peer_stats for peer {} which should remove the ip {}",
peer_id,
ip
);
}
}
/// Removes a peer from the score table. This retains peer statistics if their score is
/// non-positive.
pub fn remove_peer(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId) {
// we only retain non-positive scores of peers
if self.score(peer_id) > 0f64 {
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) = self.peer_stats.entry(*peer_id) {
protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
Self::remove_ips_for_peer(entry.get(), &mut self.peer_ips, peer_id);
entry.remove();
}
return;
}
// if the peer is retained (including it's score) the `first_message_delivery` counters
// are reset to 0 and mesh delivery penalties applied.
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
for (topic, topic_stats) in peer_stats.topics.iter_mut() {
topic_stats.first_message_deliveries = 0f64;
if let Some(threshold) = self
.params
.topics
.get(topic)
.map(|param| param.mesh_message_deliveries_threshold)
{
if topic_stats.in_mesh()
&& topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active
&& topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries < threshold
{
let deficit = threshold - topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries;
topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty += deficit * deficit;
}
}
topic_stats.mesh_status = MeshStatus::InActive;
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active = false;
}
peer_stats.status = ConnectionStatus::Disconnected {
expire: Instant::now() + self.params.retain_score,
};
}
}
/// Handles scoring functionality as a peer GRAFTs to a topic.
pub fn graft(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, topic: impl Into<TopicHash>) {
let topic = topic.into();
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
// if we are scoring the topic, update the mesh status.
if let Some(topic_stats) = peer_stats.stats_or_default_mut(topic, &self.params) {
topic_stats.mesh_status = MeshStatus::new_active();
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active = false;
}
}
}
/// Handles scoring functionality as a peer PRUNEs from a topic.
pub fn prune(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, topic: TopicHash) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
// if we are scoring the topic, update the mesh status.
if let Some(topic_stats) = peer_stats.stats_or_default_mut(topic.clone(), &self.params)
{
// sticky mesh delivery rate failure penalty
let threshold = self
.params
.topics
.get(&topic)
.expect("Topic must exist in order for there to be topic stats")
.mesh_message_deliveries_threshold;
if topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active
&& topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries < threshold
{
let deficit = threshold - topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries;
topic_stats.mesh_failure_penalty += deficit * deficit;
}
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries_active = false;
topic_stats.mesh_status = MeshStatus::InActive;
}
}
}
pub fn validate_message(&mut self, _from: &PeerId, msg_id: &MessageId, topic_hash: &TopicHash) {
// adds an empty record with the message id
self.deliveries
.entry(msg_id.clone())
.or_insert_with(DeliveryRecord::default);
if let Some(callback) = self.message_delivery_time_callback {
if self
.peer_stats
.get(_from)
.and_then(|s| s.topics.get(topic_hash))
.map(|ts| ts.in_mesh())
.unwrap_or(false)
{
callback(_from, topic_hash, 0.0);
}
}
}
pub fn deliver_message(&mut self, from: &PeerId, msg_id: &MessageId, topic_hash: &TopicHash) {
self.mark_first_message_delivery(from, topic_hash);
let record = self
.deliveries
.entry(msg_id.clone())
.or_insert_with(DeliveryRecord::default);
// this should be the first delivery trace
if record.status != DeliveryStatus::Unknown {
warn!("Unexpected delivery trace: Message from {} was first seen {}s ago and has a delivery status {:?}", from, record.first_seen.elapsed().as_secs(), record.status);
return;
}
// mark the message as valid and reward mesh peers that have already forwarded it to us
record.status = DeliveryStatus::Valid(Instant::now());
for peer in record.peers.iter().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>() {
// this check is to make sure a peer can't send us a message twice and get a double
// count if it is a first delivery
if &peer != from {
self.mark_duplicate_message_delivery(&peer, topic_hash, None);
}
}
}
/// Similar to `reject_message` except does not require the message id or reason for an invalid message.
pub fn reject_invalid_message(&mut self, from: &PeerId, topic_hash: &TopicHash) {
debug!(
"Message from {} rejected because of ValidationError or SelfOrigin",
from
);
self.mark_invalid_message_delivery(from, topic_hash);
}
// Reject a message.
pub fn reject_message(
&mut self,
from: &PeerId,
msg_id: &MessageId,
topic_hash: &TopicHash,
reason: RejectReason,
) {
match reason {
// these messages are not tracked, but the peer is penalized as they are invalid
RejectReason::ValidationError(_) | RejectReason::SelfOrigin => {
self.reject_invalid_message(from, topic_hash);
return;
}
// we ignore those messages, so do nothing.
RejectReason::BlackListedPeer | RejectReason::BlackListedSource => {
return;
}
_ => {} // the rest are handled after record creation
}
let peers: Vec<_> = {
let mut record = self
.deliveries
.entry(msg_id.clone())
.or_insert_with(DeliveryRecord::default);
// this should be the first delivery trace
if record.status != DeliveryStatus::Unknown {
warn!("Unexpected delivery trace: Message from {} was first seen {}s ago and has a delivery status {:?}", from, record.first_seen.elapsed().as_secs(), record.status);
return;
}
if let RejectReason::ValidationIgnored = reason {
// we were explicitly instructed by the validator to ignore the message but not penalize
// the peer
record.status = DeliveryStatus::Ignored;
record.peers.clear();
return;
}
// mark the message as invalid and penalize peers that have already forwarded it.
record.status = DeliveryStatus::Invalid;
// release the delivery time tracking map to free some memory early
record.peers.drain().collect()
};
self.mark_invalid_message_delivery(from, topic_hash);
for peer_id in peers.iter() {
self.mark_invalid_message_delivery(peer_id, topic_hash)
}
}
pub fn duplicated_message(
&mut self,
from: &PeerId,
msg_id: &MessageId,
topic_hash: &TopicHash,
) {
let record = self
.deliveries
.entry(msg_id.clone())
.or_insert_with(DeliveryRecord::default);
if record.peers.get(from).is_some() {
// we have already seen this duplicate!
return;
}
if let Some(callback) = self.message_delivery_time_callback {
let time = if let DeliveryStatus::Valid(validated) = record.status {
validated.elapsed().as_secs_f64()
} else {
0.0
};
if self
.peer_stats
.get(from)
.and_then(|s| s.topics.get(topic_hash))
.map(|ts| ts.in_mesh())
.unwrap_or(false)
{
callback(from, topic_hash, time);
}
}
match record.status {
DeliveryStatus::Unknown => {
// the message is being validated; track the peer delivery and wait for
// the Deliver/Reject notification.
record.peers.insert(*from);
protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
}
DeliveryStatus::Valid(validated) => {
// mark the peer delivery time to only count a duplicate delivery once.
record.peers.insert(*from);
protocols/gossipsub: Add Gossipsub v1.1 support This commit upgrades the current gossipsub implementation to support the [v1.1 spec](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md). It adds a number of features, bug fixes and performance improvements. Besides support for all new 1.1 features, other improvements that are of particular note: - Improved duplicate LRU-time cache (this was previously a severe bottleneck for large message throughput topics) - Extended message validation configuration options - Arbitrary topics (users can now implement their own hashing schemes) - Improved message validation handling - Invalid messages are no longer dropped but sent to the behaviour for application-level processing (including scoring) - Support for floodsub, gossipsub v1 and gossipsub v2 - Protobuf encoding has been shifted into the behaviour. This has permitted two improvements: 1. Message size verification during publishing (report to the user if the message is too large before attempting to send). 2. Message fragmentation. If an RPC is too large it is fragmented into its sub components and sent in smaller chunks. Additional Notes The peer eXchange protocol defined in the v1.1 spec is inactive in its current form. The current implementation permits sending `PeerId` in `PRUNE` messages, however a `PeerId` is not sufficient to form a new connection to a peer. A `Signed Address Record` is required to safely transmit peer identity information. Once these are confirmed (https://github.com/libp2p/specs/pull/217) a future PR will implement these and make PX usable. Co-authored-by: Max Inden <mail@max-inden.de> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: blacktemplar <blacktemplar@a1.net> Co-authored-by: Rüdiger Klaehn <rklaehn@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roman S. Borschel <roman@parity.io> Co-authored-by: Roman Borschel <romanb@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David Craven <david@craven.ch>
2021-01-07 18:19:31 +11:00
self.mark_duplicate_message_delivery(from, topic_hash, Some(validated));
}
DeliveryStatus::Invalid => {
// we no longer track delivery time
self.mark_invalid_message_delivery(from, topic_hash);
}
DeliveryStatus::Ignored => {
// the message was ignored; do nothing (we don't know if it was valid)
}
}
}
/// Sets the application specific score for a peer. Returns true if the peer is the peer is
/// connected or if the score of the peer is not yet expired and false otherwise.
pub fn set_application_score(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, new_score: f64) -> bool {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
peer_stats.application_score = new_score;
true
} else {
false
}
}
/// Sets scoring parameters for a topic.
pub fn set_topic_params(&mut self, topic_hash: TopicHash, params: TopicScoreParams) {
use hash_map::Entry::*;
match self.params.topics.entry(topic_hash.clone()) {
Occupied(mut entry) => {
let first_message_deliveries_cap = params.first_message_deliveries_cap;
let mesh_message_delivieries_cap = params.mesh_message_deliveries_cap;
let old_params = entry.insert(params);
if old_params.first_message_deliveries_cap > first_message_deliveries_cap {
for stats in &mut self.peer_stats.values_mut() {
if let Some(tstats) = stats.topics.get_mut(&topic_hash) {
if tstats.first_message_deliveries > first_message_deliveries_cap {
tstats.first_message_deliveries = first_message_deliveries_cap;
}
}
}
}
if old_params.mesh_message_deliveries_cap > mesh_message_delivieries_cap {
for stats in self.peer_stats.values_mut() {
if let Some(tstats) = stats.topics.get_mut(&topic_hash) {
if tstats.mesh_message_deliveries > mesh_message_delivieries_cap {
tstats.mesh_message_deliveries = mesh_message_delivieries_cap;
}
}
}
}
}
Vacant(entry) => {
entry.insert(params);
}
}
}
/// Increments the "invalid message deliveries" counter for all scored topics the message
/// is published in.
fn mark_invalid_message_delivery(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, topic_hash: &TopicHash) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
if let Some(topic_stats) =
peer_stats.stats_or_default_mut(topic_hash.clone(), &self.params)
{
debug!(
"Peer {} delivered an invalid message in topic {} and gets penalized \
for it",
peer_id, topic_hash
);
topic_stats.invalid_message_deliveries += 1f64;
}
}
}
/// Increments the "first message deliveries" counter for all scored topics the message is
/// published in, as well as the "mesh message deliveries" counter, if the peer is in the
/// mesh for the topic.
fn mark_first_message_delivery(&mut self, peer_id: &PeerId, topic_hash: &TopicHash) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
if let Some(topic_stats) =
peer_stats.stats_or_default_mut(topic_hash.clone(), &self.params)
{
let cap = self
.params
.topics
.get(topic_hash)
.expect("Topic must exist if there are known topic_stats")
.first_message_deliveries_cap;
topic_stats.first_message_deliveries =
if topic_stats.first_message_deliveries + 1f64 > cap {
cap
} else {
topic_stats.first_message_deliveries + 1f64
};
if let MeshStatus::Active { .. } = topic_stats.mesh_status {
let cap = self
.params
.topics
.get(topic_hash)
.expect("Topic must exist if there are known topic_stats")
.mesh_message_deliveries_cap;
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries =
if topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries + 1f64 > cap {
cap
} else {
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries + 1f64
};
}
}
}
}
/// Increments the "mesh message deliveries" counter for messages we've seen before, as long the
/// message was received within the P3 window.
fn mark_duplicate_message_delivery(
&mut self,
peer_id: &PeerId,
topic_hash: &TopicHash,
validated_time: Option<Instant>,
) {
if let Some(peer_stats) = self.peer_stats.get_mut(peer_id) {
let now = if validated_time.is_some() {
Some(Instant::now())
} else {
None
};
if let Some(topic_stats) =
peer_stats.stats_or_default_mut(topic_hash.clone(), &self.params)
{
if let MeshStatus::Active { .. } = topic_stats.mesh_status {
let topic_params = self
.params
.topics
.get(topic_hash)
.expect("Topic must exist if there are known topic_stats");
// check against the mesh delivery window -- if the validated time is passed as 0, then
// the message was received before we finished validation and thus falls within the mesh
// delivery window.
let mut falls_in_mesh_deliver_window = true;
if let Some(validated_time) = validated_time {
if let Some(now) = &now {
//should always be true
let window_time = validated_time
.checked_add(topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_window)
.unwrap_or_else(|| *now);
if now > &window_time {
falls_in_mesh_deliver_window = false;
}
}
}
if falls_in_mesh_deliver_window {
let cap = topic_params.mesh_message_deliveries_cap;
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries =
if topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries + 1f64 > cap {
cap
} else {
topic_stats.mesh_message_deliveries + 1f64
};
}
}
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn mesh_message_deliveries(&self, peer: &PeerId, topic: &TopicHash) -> Option<f64> {
self.peer_stats
.get(peer)
.and_then(|s| s.topics.get(topic))
.map(|t| t.mesh_message_deliveries)
}
}
/// The reason a Gossipsub message has been rejected.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub(crate) enum RejectReason {
/// The message failed the configured validation during decoding.
ValidationError(ValidationError),
/// The message source is us.
SelfOrigin,
/// The peer that sent the message was blacklisted.
BlackListedPeer,
/// The source (from field) of the message was blacklisted.
BlackListedSource,
/// The validation was ignored.
ValidationIgnored,
/// The validation failed.
ValidationFailed,
}